But in cybersecurity, no fortress is impregnable. Attackers have stopped trying to break down the front door. Instead, they are learning to outflank the very assumptions Terranova’s training is built upon.
Terranova’s desktop simulations never flagged it. The corporate web proxy never saw it. The flank is complete. Terranova famously advocates for positive reinforcement—never shaming users who fail simulations. Psychologically, this is sound. But sophisticated attackers have weaponized this culture of psychological safety. outflank terranova security
Instead, the email says: “Please reply to this message to confirm your approval for invoice #4421.” The user replies. The attacker then engages in a conversational, low-and-slow confidence scam, eventually extracting credentials or payment details via a clean, manually typed URL. Because there was no initial malicious link, the simulation never happened. The attacker didn’t need to trick the click; they tricked the conversation. Perhaps the most elegant outflank of Terranova’s desktop-focused training is the rise of QR code phishing . But in cybersecurity, no fortress is impregnable
An email arrives that looks like a multi-factor authentication prompt or a shared document notification. It contains a benign-looking QR code. The user is trained to check URLs—but a QR code hides the destination. They scan it with their personal phone, which lacks the corporate email security filter. The phone opens a perfect replica of the Microsoft 365 login page. The user enters their credentials. The attacker now has them. Terranova’s desktop simulations never flagged it
When a C-suite executive’s legitimate email account is hijacked via token theft (not a password phish), the resulting malicious email comes from a known, trusted sender. It passes the "Terranova test." No spoofed domain, no odd grammar—just a real email from a real boss asking for an urgent gift card purchase or wire transfer. The training never triggers because the user did everything correctly. The flank succeeded because the trust was legitimate, not simulated. Terranova’s core metric is the email click rate. Attackers have simply moved the battlefield.
Instead of sending a phishing email, they send a Teams message, a Slack DM, a LinkedIn InMail, or even a voicemail (vishing). They know that many organizations’ security awareness training is email-centric. By shifting to collaboration tools or phone calls, the attacker exploits a training gap. The user has been conditioned to suspect strange emails but has no framework for the urgent SMS from “IT Support” asking for their MFA code. This channel outflank renders the entire email simulation library irrelevant. A core tenet of Terranova training is: Don’t click links in unsolicited emails. Attackers now craft lures with no links at all .
But in cybersecurity, no fortress is impregnable. Attackers have stopped trying to break down the front door. Instead, they are learning to outflank the very assumptions Terranova’s training is built upon.
Terranova’s desktop simulations never flagged it. The corporate web proxy never saw it. The flank is complete. Terranova famously advocates for positive reinforcement—never shaming users who fail simulations. Psychologically, this is sound. But sophisticated attackers have weaponized this culture of psychological safety.
Instead, the email says: “Please reply to this message to confirm your approval for invoice #4421.” The user replies. The attacker then engages in a conversational, low-and-slow confidence scam, eventually extracting credentials or payment details via a clean, manually typed URL. Because there was no initial malicious link, the simulation never happened. The attacker didn’t need to trick the click; they tricked the conversation. Perhaps the most elegant outflank of Terranova’s desktop-focused training is the rise of QR code phishing .
An email arrives that looks like a multi-factor authentication prompt or a shared document notification. It contains a benign-looking QR code. The user is trained to check URLs—but a QR code hides the destination. They scan it with their personal phone, which lacks the corporate email security filter. The phone opens a perfect replica of the Microsoft 365 login page. The user enters their credentials. The attacker now has them.
When a C-suite executive’s legitimate email account is hijacked via token theft (not a password phish), the resulting malicious email comes from a known, trusted sender. It passes the "Terranova test." No spoofed domain, no odd grammar—just a real email from a real boss asking for an urgent gift card purchase or wire transfer. The training never triggers because the user did everything correctly. The flank succeeded because the trust was legitimate, not simulated. Terranova’s core metric is the email click rate. Attackers have simply moved the battlefield.
Instead of sending a phishing email, they send a Teams message, a Slack DM, a LinkedIn InMail, or even a voicemail (vishing). They know that many organizations’ security awareness training is email-centric. By shifting to collaboration tools or phone calls, the attacker exploits a training gap. The user has been conditioned to suspect strange emails but has no framework for the urgent SMS from “IT Support” asking for their MFA code. This channel outflank renders the entire email simulation library irrelevant. A core tenet of Terranova training is: Don’t click links in unsolicited emails. Attackers now craft lures with no links at all .