Xerox had invented the digital future and then failed to own it. It is the ultimate case study in – a market leader so wedded to its existing customers and profit model that it cannot see (or act on) the disruptive technology it has created. III. Decline, Restructuring, and the Japanese Onslaught (1980s–1990s) While Xerox played in the high-end, slow-to-market workstation space, its core copier business was attacked from below. Japanese companies, led by Canon , exploited a loophole. Xerox’s patents expired in the late 1970s. Canon introduced a radically different business model: the personal or desktop copier (e.g., Canon NP-200). Instead of leasing large, complex machines that required service technicians, Canon sold small, cheap, reliable copiers using a replaceable cartridge system (the "all-in-one" toner, drum, and developer unit). This shifted maintenance from a trained technician to the user.
The final act of the old Xerox came in . After years of pressure from activist investors (notably Carl Icahn), Xerox entered into a $6.1 billion deal to be acquired by Fujifilm Holdings . The plan was to merge Xerox into their existing long-standing joint venture, Fuji Xerox, and cut costs. The new entity would be called "Fuji Xerox," and Xerox as an independent American icon would effectively end. xerox wikipédia
However, in a moment of visionary genius (or institutional irony), Xerox created one of history’s most influential research centers. In 1970, they established the in California. PARC’s mission was to explore the "architecture of information." Xerox had invented the digital future and then